I am a historical novelist by inclination and a former government internal auditor by profession. The two occupations require very different approaches to evidence.
As a novelist, I occasionally alter historical details in the interests of narrative coherence. When I do so, I disclose those departures in an author's note. Fiction has an obligation to entertain, but it should not knowingly mislead readers about what is known and what has been invented.
As an auditor, however, the opposite principle applies. Internal auditors are not primarily concerned with checking arithmetic. Their role is to determine whether the evidence supports the conclusions being drawn, whether the underlying assumptions are reasonable, and whether adequate systems exist to manage risk and prevent error. In effect, auditing is concerned with forming a true, fair and evidence-based view of complex problems.
It is from this perspective that I approach the historical debate surrounding the Australian Frontier Wars and, in particular, estimates of Aboriginal deaths attributed to the Queensland Native Police.
The purpose of this essay is not to deny the reality of frontier violence. Nor is it to minimise the suffering experienced by Aboriginal communities during the nineteenth century. The historical record demonstrates that violence occurred, sometimes on a significant scale.
Rather, the purpose of this essay is to examine the methodologies by which casualty figures have been estimated and to ask whether the confidence with which some figures are presented is justified by the underlying evidence.
Over the past several decades, casualty estimates associated with frontier conflict have steadily increased.
Earlier work by historian Henry Reynolds proposed that approximately 20,000 Aboriginal people may have died during conflicts associated with European settlement. Since then, considerably higher estimates have appeared in the literature.
Among the most influential are those advanced by Raymond Evans and Robert Ørsted-Jensen. Their work estimates approximately 44,540 Aboriginal deaths in Queensland arising from Native Police and civilian actions, while broader calculations produce figures in excess of 60,000 conflict-related deaths.
These estimates have become increasingly important in contemporary political and cultural debates. They are cited in discussions concerning national memory, reconciliation, commemoration and whether the Frontier Wars should occupy a position within Australia's military narrative equivalent to that of overseas campaigns.
For that reason alone, the methodologies used to derive such figures deserve close scrutiny.
The methodology employed by Evans and Ørsted-Jensen can be summarised as follows.
First, they identify approximately eighty-four Native Police camps operating between 1860 and 1900, producing a cumulative total of 596 camp-years.
Second, they estimate that detachments from those camps conducted approximately ten patrols per year, resulting in a total of around 6,000 patrols.
Third, they conclude that approximately 57 per cent of these patrols resulted in a "dispersal" of Aboriginal people.
Fourth, they interpret the term "dispersal" as implying lethal violence and estimate an average of approximately 12.7 Aboriginal deaths per dispersal.
These assumptions generate an estimated total of over 41,000 Aboriginal deaths attributable to Native Police activities during the period 1860-1900.
Additional assumptions are then applied to estimate deaths occurring prior to 1860 and deaths attributed to civilian settlers, resulting in a total estimate exceeding 60,000 fatalities.
At first glance, the methodology appears systematic. However, closer examination suggests several potential difficulties.
The principal methodological issue is not any single assumption. Rather, it is the accumulation of multiple assumptions upon one another.
The final estimate depends on a chain of inferences:
Each stage introduces uncertainty.
In statistics, uncertainty does not disappear when assumptions are combined. It compounds. Consequently, a final number may appear precise while resting upon a series of estimates, each of which carries a significant margin of error.
As an auditor, I would regard such a methodology as highly sensitive to the assumptions selected by the researcher. Small adjustments to any one assumption could potentially produce substantially different outcomes.
The critical question therefore becomes not whether the estimate is possible, but how much confidence can reasonably be placed in its accuracy.
A second issue concerns the operational size of the Native Police.
Modern discussions frequently emphasise the force's geographical reach and long operational history. Less attention is often given to its relatively modest staffing levels.
Historical records suggest that the force generally consisted of approximately one hundred personnel during its early period, rose to perhaps 170 officers and troopers at its peak during the 1870s, and subsequently declined as frontier settlement advanced and the organisation was gradually wound down.
Structurally, the organisation resembled a cavalry squadron rather than a modern police force.
The force appears typically to have operated with approximately one European officer commanding eight Aboriginal troopers. Across its history, roughly 200 commissioned officers are estimated to have served within the organisation.
These numbers do not preclude the occurrence of atrocities. Small organisations are capable of inflicting considerable harm.
Nevertheless, organisational size remains relevant when evaluating casualty estimates extending into the tens of thousands. Any attempt to quantify fatalities should take account of such practical considerations as manpower, operational tempo, logistics, mobility and command capacity.
These factors rarely receive the same emphasis as the resulting casualty estimates.
Another aspect often overlooked in public discussion is the existence of formal oversight mechanisms.
The Native Police were the subject of parliamentary scrutiny on multiple occasions. Investigations and inquiries were conducted both before and after Queensland's separation from New South Wales.
Historical records also indicate that a significant number of officers were dismissed, forced to resign or disciplined for various forms of misconduct.
This evidence should not be interpreted as proving that abuses did not occur. On the contrary, disciplinary action may suggest that abuses were occurring and that authorities were attempting, with varying degrees of success, to address them.
However, the existence of inquiries, parliamentary debates and disciplinary actions complicates any portrayal of the organisation as operating entirely outside administrative oversight.
The historical reality appears more complex than either a wholly benign or wholly criminal interpretation would suggest.
A recurring argument in frontier-war historiography is that many records have been lost or destroyed, making precise reconstruction impossible.
There is undoubtedly some truth in this observation. The documentary record is incomplete.
However, incompleteness does not necessarily imply complete absence of evidence. Information can often be recovered indirectly through parliamentary records, budget papers, personnel returns, administrative correspondence, judicial proceedings and newspaper reporting.
The existence of evidentiary gaps presents historians with a genuine challenge. Yet those gaps also require caution. Estimates developed in the absence of direct evidence should be clearly distinguished from figures derived from documented incidents.
The distinction between documented deaths and inferred deaths is fundamental to sound historical analysis.
The existence of widespread frontier violence is not in serious dispute.
Nor is it disputed that Aboriginal communities suffered severe population loss as a consequence of disease, displacement, conflict and social disruption following European settlement.
The more difficult question concerns quantification.
How accurately can modern historians estimate deaths arising from events that occurred across vast geographical distances, over many decades, under conditions where record-keeping was often incomplete and eyewitness testimony frequently contradictory?
This is not merely a historical problem. It is a methodological problem.
Historians must often estimate where direct evidence is unavailable. However, estimates should remain recognisable as estimates. They should not acquire an unwarranted appearance of precision simply through repetition.
The central issue is not whether violence occurred on the Australian frontier. It did.
Nor is the issue whether atrocities occurred. The historical record demonstrates that serious acts of violence were committed by settlers, police and Aboriginal groups during the course of frontier conflict.
The real question concerns evidentiary confidence.
How certain can we be about casualty estimates derived from multiple layers of inference and assumption?
As an auditor, I was taught that every conclusion is only as reliable as the assumptions underpinning it. Where estimates are constructed through successive stages of inference, uncertainty should form part of the conclusion rather than being treated as a footnote.
Australia deserves an honest and rigorous examination of its past. Such an examination should neither exaggerate nor minimise historical wrongdoing. Instead, it should distinguish clearly between what is known, what is inferred and what remains uncertain.
That approach may not produce figures that satisfy every participant in the debate. However, it is ultimately the only approach consistent with both sound historical practice and the broader principles of evidence-based inquiry.
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